How the UK planned for the wrong pandemic

Even as Kovid Hits, the government and its health officials had a boom in their confidence about the ability to face.

Dr. Jenny Harris, then Deputy Chief Medical Officer, for England, appreciated the UK as “international exemplary” in his preparations in one of the early TV press conferences.

She was not the only one who thought in this way-a government review exactly a year before the acute, epidemic praised our “world-agar capabilities”.

But such a belief said that Barrows Hallet said that he had first determined from his covid reports, “dangerously wrong”.

Britain had actually prepared for the wrong epidemic. How did this happen?

Crossing 217 pages and over 80,000 wordsBairon Hallet has criticized a wide and harmful criticism of how the over-confidence, ruined opportunities and the Maded-pinching left Britain’s sleep in an epidemic, which claims to claim lives of more than 200,000 people and harm the economy and society for a long time.

The initial reason for this can be detected from 2009 and swine flu epidemics. It was another virus that quickly flowed to the world, but it turned out to be light, partly because the older people felt that there was some immunity due to the previous interaction of uniform stress.

The report of Baronet Hallets states that “Lulla” turned Britain into false sense of security. Two years later, a new epidemic scheme was produced. This strategy was not based on trying to suppress the epidemic virus heavy – instead it was lighter about reducing its unavoidable proliferation in belief that the effects would be mild.

Because the strategy was based on flu, hoping that vaccines could be deployed quickly and in the meantime, antiviral drugs could be used to reduce the severity of the disease.

But Kovid was not flu – and certainly not light flu.

The Kovid epidemic has been lined up with the outdoor opportunities from 2011 till the beginning of the epidemic.

Britain did not learn from East Asian countries such as Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. He used his experience of mars (Middle East respiratory syndrome) and other coronavirus outbreaks of sars (severe acute respiratory syndrome), so that they had a plan to quickly tested and detect and introduce quarantine procedures. Border control measures including travel restrictions and testing can also be deployed.

In contrast, the UK abandoned the community test in Vasant 2020 as if Kovid had launched.

In his evidence for this module, Jeremy Hunt, who was the Health Secretary from 2012 to 2018, said that if we have learned from abroad, we could also save from lockdown earlier.

But it is not that there was no attempt to learn lessons.

In the 2010s, several training programs were organized, in which outbreaks of both flu and coronvirus were imitated to stress the UK preparations.

An incident in 2016 identified an anxiety in response to an incident called exercise cycling and kept plans to update the plans by 2018.

But this did not happen, and out of the 22 recommendations made after that exercise till June 2020, only eight recommendations were met.

Citing the report for the lack of this action, one of the reasons was that the UK government has competitive demands of operations for the contingent scheme of the Government, which are planning for a Brexit without any behavior.

But Britain’s inertia cannot be blamed on Brexit alone. The argument carried out by the previous government is that Brexit left Britain more agile in other matters, such as rolling stocking drugs and vaccines.

The way the system was installed for epidemic planning was also a factor. Barona Hallet has described a labyrinth system of committees, partnerships and boards, which had responsibility for the civil emergency plan.

Divergence, which means that health policy is the responsibility of every nation, also in complex cases.

On page 19 of the report, one diagram reflects the problem more than words.

To clarify the complexity of structures in the place, the report includes a spaghetti diagram that shows various boards and bodies responsible for epidemic. There are more than 60 with several lines of the command.

This meant that there was not a single body which was eventually accountable.

But this was not just a system contributing to politicians and system to contribute to mistakes.

Scientists – so often appreciated at the beginning of the epidemic – is also a case to respond, clearly explains the report of Barona Hallet.

He said that he was infected with Groupthink-no conservative was challenging.

The advice was narrowly focused with very little ideas, which were given to the socio-economic effects of recommended tasks.

It said that the ministers did not enough to challenge what they were being told and the way various advisory groups did not have enough freedom or autonomy to listen to the sounds hearing.

This narrowness of ideas and action was also prevalent in public health England, which was the body responsible for health protection at the beginning of the epidemic.

Its Chief Executive Officer, Duncan Selbi investigated whether he never planned or gave the government a system for a system for mass testing.

This is the reason why Barona Hallet equally concluded the officials, experts and ministers to bear the responsibility for what went wrong.